





igrant remittances have become a major source of external development 
finance. They can play an effective role in reducing poverty. And they 
provide a convenient angle for approaching the complex migration 
agenda.
Remittances are personal flows from migrants to their friends and families   
and should not be taxed or directed to specific development uses. Instead, the 
development community should make remittance services cheaper and more 
convenient and indirectly leverage these flows to improve financial access of 
migrants, their beneficiaries, and the financial intermediaries in the origin coun-
tries.
The Growing Importance and Development Impact of Remittances
Remittances received from migrants abroad are one of the largest sources 
of external finance for developing countries. In 2006, recorded remittances sent 
home by migrants from developing countries reached $206 billion, up from $193 
billion in 2005 and more than double the level in 2001 (Table 1). The true size of 
remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is 
believed to be even larger. They are almost as large as foreign direct investment 
and more than twice as large as official aid received by developing countries 
(Figure 1).
The doubling of recorded remittances over the past five years is a result of a 
combination of factors: better measurement of flows; increased scrutiny since the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001; reduction in remittance costs and expanding 1  Dilip Ratha
networks in the industry; depreciation of the dollar (raising the dollar value of 
remittances in other currencies); and growth in the migrant stock and incomes.
Poor Countries Receive Relatively Larger Remittances
In 2006, the top three recipients of remittances—India, Mexico, and China—
each received nearly $25 billion (Figure 2). But smaller and poorer countries tend 
to receive relatively larger remittances when the size of the economy is taken 
into account. Expressing remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients were 
Moldova (30 percent), Tonga (27 percent), Guyana (22 percent) and Haiti (21 per-
Table 1
Global Flows of International Migrant Remittances (U.S.$ billion)
                                 Percent change
INFLOWS  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 (est.)   2005–06   2001–06
All developing countries  85  96  117  145  165  193  206  7  115
Low-income.countries. 22. 26. 32. 40. 42. 48. 55. 15. 112
Middle-income.countries. 63. 70. 85. 105. 123. 145. 152. 5. 117
..Lower.middle-income. 43. 48. 61. 75. 86. 98. 102. 4. 113
..Upper.middle-income. 20. 22. 24. 30. 37. 47. 50. 6. 127
. . . . . . . . .
East.Asia.and.the.Pacific. 17. 20. 29. 35. 39. 45. 47. 4. 135
Europe.and.Central.Asia. 13. 13. 14. 17. 23. 31. 32. 3. 146
Latin.America.and.the..
..Caribbean. 20. 24. 28. 35. 41. 48. 53. 10. 121
Middle.East.and..
..North.Africa. 13. 15. 16. 20. 23. 24. 25. 4. 67
South.Asia. 17. 19. 24. 31. 31. 36. 41. 14. 116
Sub-Saharan.Africa. 5. 5. 5. 6. 8. 9. 9. 0. 80
High-income.OECD. 46. 50. 52. 59. 66. 68. 68. 0. 36
World  132  147  170  205  233  262  276  5  88
                                Percent change
OUTFLOWS  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005      2004–05   2001–05
All developing countries  12  14  21  25  32  38     19  171
High-income.OECD. 76. 83. 88. 98. 111. 119. . 7. 43
High-income.non-OECD. 22. 22. 22. 21. 20. 22. . 10. 0
World  110  118  131  144  163  179    10  52
NOTES: Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant 
transfers. Dollar amounts are nominal. The complete data set, including country-specific information, is available 
at www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. 
SOURCE:  World  Bank  staff  calculations  based  on  International  Monetary  Fund’s  Balance  of  Payments 
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cent). Remittances are thus more evenly distributed across developing countries 
than are private capital flows.
Remittances Are Stable or Even Countercyclical
Remittances tend to be more stable than private capital flows and may even 
be countercyclical relative to the recipient economy. They tend to rise when the 
recipient economy suffers a downturn in activity, an economic crisis, natural di-
saster, or political conflict, as migrants may send more funds during hard times to 
help their families and friends. Remittances rose during the financial crisis in 1995 
in Mexico and in 1998 in Indonesia and Thailand (Figure 3). They also increased 
following hurricanes in Central America. In Somalia and Haiti, they have provided 
a lifeline for the poor. In addition to bringing the direct benefit of higher wages 
earned abroad, migration helps households diversify their sources of income and 
thus reduce their vulnerability to risks.
Remittances Reduce Poverty
Remittances directly augment the income of the recipient households. In ad-
dition to providing financial resources for poor households, they affect poverty 
Figure 1
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and welfare through indirect multiplier effects and also macroeconomic effects. 
Also, these flows typically do not suffer from the governance problems that may 
be associated with official aid flows. 
Cross-country regression analysis shows significant poverty reduction effects 
of remittances: A 10 percent increase in per capita official remittances may lead to 
a 3.5 percent decline in the share of poor people. Recent research indicates that 
remittances reduced poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, although 
with heterogeneous effects across countries.
Household  survey  data  show  that  remittances  have  reduced  the  poverty 
head-count ratio (percent of population below the national poverty line) signifi-
cantly in several low-income countries—by 11 percentage points in Uganda, 6 in 
Bangladesh, and 5 in Ghana. In Nepal, remittances may explain a quarter to a half 
of the 11-percentage-point reduction in the poverty head-count rate over the past 
decade (in the face of a difficult political and economic situation).
The analysis of poverty impact of remittances must account for counterfactual 
loss of income that the migrant may experience due to migration (for example, if 
the migrant has to give up his or her job). Such losses are likely to be small for the 
poor and unemployed but large for the middle- and upper-income classes.
Very poor migrants may not be able to send remittances in the initial years 
after migration. Also, the remittances of the very rich migrants may be smaller 
than the loss of income due to migration. But for the middle-income groups, re-
Figure 3
Remittances Rise During Crisis, Natural Disaster, or Conflict
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mittances enable recipients to move up to a higher income group. In Sri Lanka, 
for example, households from the third through the eighth income decile moved 
up the income ladder thanks to remittances (Figure 4).
Remittances Finance Education, Health, and Entrepreneurship
Remittances are associated with increased household investments in educa-
tion, entrepreneurship, and health—all of which have a high social return in most 
circumstances. Studies based on household surveys in El Salvador and Sri Lanka 
find that children of remittance-recipient households have a lower school dropout 
rate and that these households spend more on private tuition for their children. 
In Sri Lanka, the children in remittance-receiving households have higher birth 
weight, reflecting that remittances enable households to afford better health care. 
Several studies also show that remittances provide capital to small entrepreneurs, 
reduce credit constraints, and increase entrepreneurship.
Remittances May Cause Currency Appreciation
Large remittance inflows, like any other foreign currency inflows, can cause 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and raise the international price of 
traditional exports. Although empirical evidence of such Dutch disease effects of 
Figure 4
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remittances is still lacking, the impact is likely to be large in small economies. Sev-
eral countries, including El Salvador, Kenya, and Moldova, are concerned about 
the effect of large remittance inflows on currency appreciation.
The traditional “sterilization” technique used to prevent currency apprecia-
tion due to natural resource windfalls, however, is not appropriate for addressing 
currency appreciation due to remittances. Unlike oil windfalls, remittances persist 
over long periods. Trying to sterilize their impacts year after year can be very 
costly. Countries have to learn to live with these persistent flows. Government 
spending on infrastructure and efforts to raise labor productivity can to some 
extent offset the currency appreciation effects of remittances.
The Effect of Remittances on Growth Is Mixed
To the extent that remittances finance education and health and increase 
investment, remittances could have a positive effect on economic growth. In 
the economies where the financial system is underdeveloped, remittances may 
alleviate credit constraints and act as a substitute for financial development. On 
the other hand, large outflows of workers (especially skilled workers) can reduce 
growth in countries of origin. Remittances may also induce recipient households 
to choose more leisure than labor, with adverse effects on growth.
Remittances may be more effective in a good policy environment. For in-
stance, a good investment climate with well-developed financial systems and 
sound institutions is likely to imply that a higher share of remittances is invested 
in physical and human capital. Remittances may also promote financial develop-
ment, which in turn can enhance growth.
Empirical evidence on the growth effects of remittances, however, remains 
mixed. In part, this is because the effects of remittances on human and physical 
capital are realized over a very long time. This is also partly due to the difficulty 
associated with disentangling remittances’ countercyclical response to growth, 
which implies that the causality runs from growth to remittances, but the correla-
tion between the two variables is negative. Finding appropriate instruments for 
controlling such reverse causality is a challenge. It would be easy to conclude that 
remittances have a negative effect on growth, but that would be erroneous. Also, 
to the extent that they increase consumption, remittances may raise individual 
income levels and reduce poverty, even if they do not directly impact growth.
Leveraging Remittances for Development
Governments  in  destination  and  origin  countries  can  facilitate  remittance 
flows and enhance their development impacts through the application of ap-
propriate policies. However, some current policy practices pose pitfalls. Almost 10  Dilip Ratha
all developing countries offer tax incentives to attract remittances, but such tax 
exemption on remittances may encourage tax evasion. Matching-fund programs 
(such as Mexico’s three-to-one program) may effectively leverage small volumes 
of collective remittances from migrant associations for small community develop-
ment projects, but such programs may not be scalable and may divert funds from 
other local funding priorities. Efforts to channel remittances to investment have 
met with little success. Instead, efforts should be made to improve the overall 
investment climate in the origin countries. Some governments have been toying 
with the idea of taxing remittances. This would have an effect similar to that of 
raising remittance costs and would hurt the poor migrants and their families in or-
igin countries. Taxation would also drive remittance flows further underground.
Remittances should not be viewed as a substitute for official development 
aid. Fundamentally, they are private money that should not be expected to fund 
public projects. Not all poor households receive remittances; official funding is 
necessary to address the needs of such households.
Leveraging Remittances for Financial Access of Migrants and Their  
Beneficiaries
Encouraging remittances through banking channels can improve the devel-
opment impact of remittances by encouraging more saving and enabling better 
matching of saving with investment opportunities. Remittances received as cash 
are less likely to be saved than those received through a bank account.
For many poor households and migrants, remittances are the only point of 
contact with the formal financial sector. By providing remittance services, banks 
and other financial institutions can attract new customers for their deposit and 
loan products. Microfinance institutions can use the history of remittance receipts 
to judge the credit history of potential customers.
Both sending and receiving countries can increase migrants’ banking access 
by allowing origin country banks to operate overseas and providing identification 
cards (such as the Mexican matrícula consular), which are accepted by banks 
to open accounts. Access to remittance services in rural and remote areas can be 
improved by encouraging the participation of microfinance institutions, credit 
unions, and saving banks (including postal saving schemes) in the remittance 
market. Existing regulations may need to be amended to allow these institutions 
to more fully participate in providing remittance services. In many countries, mi-
crofinance institutions would need legal permission to receive foreign exchange. 
In some cases, they may need limited access to national clearance and settlement 
systems.
Leveraging Remittances for Capital Market Access of Financial Intermediaries
Remittances can improve a country’s creditworthiness and thereby enhance 11  Leveraging Remittances for Development
its access to international capital markets. Hard currency remittances, properly ac-
counted, can significantly improve country risk rating. The ratio of debt to exports 
of goods and services, a key indebtedness indicator, would increase significantly 
if remittances were excluded from the denominator (Figure 5). Model-based cal-
culations using debt-to-export ratios that include remittances in the denominator 
indicate that including remittances in creditworthiness assessments would im-
prove credit ratings for Lebanon (by two notches) and result in implied sovereign 
spread (the difference in interest rates between a sovereign bond and comparable 
U.S. treasuries) reductions ranging from 130 to 334 basis points.
Future flows of remittances can be used as collateral to improve the rating 
of the subsovereign borrowers, allowing them to pierce the sovereign rating ceil-
ing. Several banks in developing countries (such as Brazil, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Turkey) have been able to raise cheaper 
and longer-term financing (more than $15 billion since 2000) from international 
capital markets via securitization of future remittance flows. By mitigating cur-
rency convertibility risk, a key component of sovereign risk, the future flow se-
curitization structure allows securities to be rated better than the sovereign credit 
rating. In the case of El Salvador, for example, the remittance-backed securities 
were rated investment grade, two to four notches above the subinvestment grade 
sovereign rating. Investment grade rating makes these transactions attractive to a 
Figure 5
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wider range of “buy-and-hold” investors (for example, insurance companies) that 
face limitations on buying subinvestment grade. As a result, the issuer can access 
international capital markets at a lower interest rate spread and longer maturity. 
Moreover, by establishing a credit history for the borrower, these deals enhance 
the ability and reduce the costs of accessing capital markets in the future.
Reducing Remittance Costs
Reducing remittance fees would increase the disposable income of poor mi-
grants, boost their incentives to send more money home, and encourage the use 
of formal remittance channels.
The cost of sending remittances tends to be high and regressive. A typical 
poor migrant sends about $200 or less per transaction. The average cost through 
the top three money transfer operators (Western Union, MoneyGram, and Dolex) 
can be as high as $16 for $100 and $18 for $200. These fees are highly regressive 
because the smaller remittances sent by poor migrants cost more.
With  increased  awareness  among  policymakers  and  migrants  and  falling 
costs of technology, remittance costs have been declining in recent years. In the 
U.S.–Mexico corridor, for example, the cost of sending $300 fell by 54 percent 
between 1999 and 2004, from more than $26 to $12. Since then, however, costs 
have remained sticky, dropping only to $10.60 by the end of 2006.
South–south remittance costs are even higher than north–south remittance 
costs (Figure 6). Nearly half the migrants from the south live in the south. Yet 
south–south remittances are either impossible due to capital and exchange con-
trols, or they are prohibitively expensive because currency conversion charges 
have to be paid at both ends.
High remittance costs faced by poor migrants can be reduced by increas-
ing access to banking and strengthening competition in the remittance industry. 
Banks tend to provide cheaper remittance services than money transfer operators. 
Entry of new market players can be facilitated by harmonizing and lowering bond 
and capital requirements, as well as avoiding overregulation such as requiring a 
full banking license for specialized money transfer operators.
Although regulations for anti-money-laundering and countering the financing 
of terrorism are necessary for security reasons, they should not make it difficult for 
money service businesses to operate accounts with correspondent banks. These 
regulations are currently unclear, and to make matters worse, they are not system-
atic or harmonized. Developing transparent compliance guidelines on anti-mon-
ey-laundering and antiterrorism-financing regulations should be a policy priority.
Sharing payment systems would avoid duplication of efforts. Establishing 
partnerships between remittance service providers and existing postal and other 
retail networks would help expand remittance services without requiring large 
fixed investments. However, exclusive partnerships between post office networks 13  Leveraging Remittances for Development
and money transfer operators have often resulted in higher remittance fees than 
when there are no such partnerships. Partnerships should be nonexclusive.
Requiring greater disclosure on fees from remittance service providers would 
help remitters make informed choices. Poor migrants would also benefit from 
financial education.
Summary: The International Remittances Agenda
Remittances can contribute significantly to poverty reduction and other mil-
lennium development goals. Following the discussion above, the international 
remittances agenda can be summarized under four headings (Figure 7):
Figure 6
South–South Remittance Fees Are Higher Than North–South Remittance Fees
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1.  Monitoring, analysis, and projection
2.  Retail payment systems
3.  Financial access of individuals or households
4.  Leveraging remittances for capital market access of financial 
      institutions or countries
1.  Monitoring,  analysis,  and  projection.  This  includes  understanding 
the size, corridors, channels, and costs of remittance (and migration) flows and 
the cyclical behavior of these flows; analysis of impacts on poverty, inequality, 
education, health, and investment in remittance recipient countries; and analysis 
of  policy  factors  affecting  remittance  costs—for  example,  entry  barriers  and 
exclusivity contracts affecting market competition and exchange controls affecting 
foreign exchange commission. The effect of cost reduction on size and channels 
of flows also falls under this group.
2. Retail payment systems. The changes in the payment system relating to 
personal remittances impact all retail or small-value payments, including person-
to-business and business-to-business payments. The items in this category include 
new payment platforms or instruments (including cell-phone-based, card-based, 
or Internet-based remittance instruments); prudential capital requirements and 
regulations  governing  access  of  remittance  agents  to  clearing  and  settlement 
systems; compliance with anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of 
terrorism; disclosure of remittance fees; and cross-border arbitration in the event 
Figure 7
The International Remittances Agenda
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that a remittance transaction is not delivered as per the service promise.
3.  Financial  access  of  individuals  or  households.  While  financial 
intermediaries such as banks, microfinance institutions, credit unions, and savings 
banks can help deliver remittance services, they can also benefit by offering 
remittance services that may attract new customers and then encourage them to 
save and invest. Besides encouraging saving out of remittances, these financial 
intermediaries can develop remittance-linked consumer or housing loans and 
insurance products. They can also use the history of remittance receipt to evaluate 
a recipient’s creditworthiness.
4.  Leveraging  remittances  for  capital  market  access  of  financial 
institutions  or  countries.  Large  and  stable  remittance  flows  undoubtedly 
improve country creditworthiness and thereby creditworthiness of subsovereign 
entities  as  well.  Banks  in  many  countries  have  used  future  remittances  as 
collateral for raising significant bond financing (sometimes billions of dollars) 
from international markets. The interest spread on these bonds was lower, and 
the tenor higher, than comparable plain sovereign bonds. Some estimates show 
that the potential for such bond financing remains untapped, especially in many 
poor countries that also receive significant remittances. The funds raised via these 
bonds can be targeted to specific development projects.
Notes
This paper draws heavily on Ratha (2003) and World Bank (2005). For more references, see World 
Bank (2005). Thanks to Uri Dadush and Sanket Mohapatra for extensive discussions and Zhimei Xu 
for research assistance. The views expressed are the author’s own, not those of the World Bank. 
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